00636nas a2200157   4500008004100000245013200041210006900173260000900242300001000251490000700261653001200268100002400280700002000304700001900324856013500343       2008                        eng d00aMergers and Acquisitions as a Response to the Deregulation of the Electric Power Industry: Value Creation or Value Destruction?0 aMergers and Acquisitions as a Response to the Deregulation of th  c2008  a21-530 v3310aFinance1 aBecker-Blease, John1 aGoldberg, Larry1 aKaen, Fred, R.  u/biblio/mergers-and-acquisitions-response-deregulation-electric-power-industry-value-creation-or-000984nas a2200169   4500008004100000245005500041210005500096260000900151300001400160490000700174520047200181653001200653653001700665100001800682700002000700856009400720       2003                        eng d00aExecutive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany0 aExecutive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany  c2003  a1391-14100 v273 aWith the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aGoldberg, Larry  u/biblio/executive-compensation-and-agency-costs-germany-200471nas a2200133   4500008004100000245005500041210005500096260002500151653001200176653001700188100001800205700002000223856009400243       2001                        eng d00aExecutive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany0 aExecutive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany  aDublin Irelandc200110aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aGoldberg, Larry  u/biblio/executive-compensation-and-agency-costs-germany-3