01086nas a2200169   4500008004100000245005900041210005900100260000900159300001200168490000700180520057500187653001200762100002000774700001600794700001200810856009400822       2003                        eng d00aHow the Equity Market Responds to Unanticipated Events0 aHow the Equity Market Responds to Unanticipated Events  c2003  a109-1330 v763 aWe examine the market reaction of prices, volume, spreads, and trading location when firms experience events that are totally unanticipated by the equity market in terms of both timing and content. We find that the response time is longer than previous studies have reported. Selling pressure, wider spreads, and higher volume remain significant for over an hour. We also find an immediate price reaction for overnight events; however, the market takes longer to react to events that occur when it is open. These findings may shed light on the efficacy of trading halts.10aFinance1 aBrooks, Raymond1 aPatel, Ajay1 aSu, Tie  u/biblio/how-equity-market-responds-unanticipated-events-001300nas a2200157   4500008004100000245010400041210006900145260000900214300001000223490000600233520072500239653001200964100002000976700001600996856013001012       2000                        eng d00aInformation Conveyed by Seasoned Security Offerings: Evidence from Components of the Bid-Ask Spread0 aInformation Conveyed by Seasoned Security Offerings Evidence fro  c2000  a83-990 v93 aWe examine the relationship between the degree of informational asymmetry surrounding a firm and the equity market's reaction to a firm's announcement to sell seasoned securities. We use the adverse-selection component of the bid”ask spread as a proxy for the informational asymmetry of a firm. For equity offers, we find that the greater the change in information asymmetry at announcement, the greater the decline in wealth. In addition, the largest decline in wealth for seasoned equity announcements is observed for firms with the largest level of pre-event adverse-selection components. For debt offers, the wealth decline is only significant for firms with the largest pre-event levels of asymmetric information.10aFinance1 aBrooks, Raymond1 aPatel, Ajay  u/biblio/information-conveyed-seasoned-security-offerings-evidence-components-bid-ask-spread-0